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Summary
This report makes two arguments about the relation-
ship of water distribution rules to water distribution
performance. First, it argues that if the water distribu-
tion rules define a pattern of water delivery that does
not match technically feasible goals of the water users,
then the users will subvert the rules. This will lead to
poor water delivery performance and increases in the
cost of irrigation to the users. Second, it argues that
inconsistency in the water distribution rules creates
difficulties in system operations that are likely to lead
to inefficient and inequitable water distribution per-
formance.
Data from the Tambraparani Irrigation System in
Tamil Nadu, India, are used to demonstrate these
points. Specifically, the allocation rules do not provide
for the irrigation of bananas although farmers want to
plant them. Farmers take a variety of actions to get
water for their bananas. In addition, inconsistencies in
the Tambraparani rules make it difficult to operate the
system according to the rules. For example, the rules
for the operation of the system reservoirs limit flows
to less-than-required for irrigation during some peri-
ods. The various inconsistencies lead to unpredictable
water deliveries. The resulting inefficiencies and ineq-
uities are demonstrated using data for the year 1994–
95.
It is argued that the problems at Tambraparani
arise from fundamental issues that apply to all large
irrigation schemes. In particular, increasing demands
on irrigation systems from both farmers and other
users make it essential to modify water distribution
rules over time. Resolution of these problems requires
devising a system by which responsible persons re-
view system performance and can initiate changes to
water distribution rules as needed. It is further argued
that involvement of the users in these changes is es-
sential to ensure that the distribution rules serve their
desires and that the users accept the limitations on
uses imposed by water availability and the features of
the system.1
In this report, we explore the relationship of
water distribution rules to water distribu-
tion performance. Specifically, we make two
arguments:
• If the water distribution rules of an irri-
gation system define a pattern of water
delivery that does not match technically
feasible irrigation services desired by
the users, then the users, often in coop-
eration with system managers, will
modify or subvert the rules to bring
water delivery into accord with their
desires. Subversion of the water distri-
bution rules will adversely affect water
delivery performance, especially equity
of distribution, and will raise the cost of
irrigation to the users.
• Inconsistencies in the water distribution
rules create difficulties in system
operations that lead to inefficient and
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inequitable water distribution per-
formance.
We use data from the Tambraparani Ir-
rigation System in Tamil Nadu, India, to
demonstrate these points. In addition, we
argue for the relevance of these propositions
to many other irrigation systems. We show
that farmers and system managers in the
Tambraparani Irrigation System in South In-
dia systematically subvert water distribution
rules that interfere with delivering water as
desired by the farmers. We then show that
this subversion leads to loss of control by the
system managers, to inequitable and unpre-
dictable deliveries, and to raising the trans-
action costs of getting water. We also show
that the Tambraparani water distribution
rules are inconsistent and that these incon-
sistencies lead to interference with operation
of the system.
Relation of Water Distribution Rules to Water Distribution
Performance
This section discusses the conceptual foun-
dation for the two arguments on the rela-
tion of water distribution rules to water dis-
tribution performance and briefly reviews
the existing literature.
Water distribution rules
Importance. Distribution of water to users
within an irrigation system involves such
decisions, as who is to get water, how much2
is to be delivered to each user, at what time
will it be delivered. These decisions are usu-
ally made with the help of publicly recog-
nized water distribution rules (Coward
1980). One reason for the existence of water
distribution rules is to simplify decision
making. Irrigation management decisions
and tasks are repeated at least once a year.
Water distribution rules reduce the effort
needed to make these decisions. Rules codify
past experience, allowing a new decision
maker to benefit from the past learning. If
multiple decision makers are involved, rules
simplify coordination of decisions.
A second reason is to reduce potential
for conflicts. When there are multiple poten-
tial users of the irrigation water, all may
want access to the water. Water distribution
decisions are political acts that involve bal-
ancing the interests of each potential user
against the interests of all the others. Pub-
licly recognized water distribution rules
give decision makers and potential users a
basis for agreement, reducing the potential
for conflicts (Bottrall 1981; Sampath and
Young 1990).
Like many other irrigation specialists,
we feel that characteristics of water distribu-
tion rules have important effects on irriga-
tion management performance.
Definition. As used here, water distri-
bution rules are a class of “rules” as defined
in the literature on common property man-
agement (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker
1993). In this view, water distribution rules
make up one type of irrigation management
institution. Our concept of water distribu-
tion rules is inclusive and subsumes such
concepts as “water allocation rules,” “water
rights,” and “system operating rules.”
We define water distribution rules as
statements that define how water is to be
distributed to the users. To qualify as a wa-
ter distribution rule, a statement must
specify at least one of the following:
• the persons or groups of people to
whom water is to be delivered (the us-
ers)
• the amount of water to be delivered to
each user (water quantity or discharge)
• when water is to be delivered to each
user (delivery period)
• the person(s) or group(s) empowered to
make decisions about water deliveries
(the system managers)
The set of water distribution rules for
any irrigation system must, directly or indi-
rectly, define all four of these items. These
items can be defined directly in a number of
ways.
Users can be individuals, groups of per-
sons, or formal organizations. They can be
defined by specific name (e.g., A. B. Rao),
by common attribute (e.g., banana growers),
or by water outlet (e.g., farmers taking wa-
ter from the Nadhiyunni Channel). While a
statement may use any of the three ways to
define users, an outlet must be specified for
actual water delivery.
The amount of water may be specified
as a quantity or as a discharge rate. Water
quantity may be defined by volume of water
(e.g., 5 million m
3), as “enough water” for a
particular purpose (e.g., water for 2 ha of
rice), or by a rule that specifies how the
quantity is to be determined (e.g., as much
as the user pays for). Discharge (water flow)
may be specified by discharge measurement
(e.g., 4 m
3/s) or by fraction of water flow
(e.g., 30% of the river discharge).
Delivery period can be defined by defi-
nite dates (e.g., from 4 January 1996 to 23
January 1996), by times within the hydro-
logic cycle (e.g., in June of each year), by an
indefinite period (e.g., “from the date of this
order”), by sequential turn (e.g., following
M. Gandhi), or by a rule that specifies how
the period will be determined (e.g., 24
hours after the order is placed).3
System managers must be identified by
specific name or by title within a named or-
ganization.
Water distribution rules may also
specify any of the first three parameters (us-
ers, quantity, and period) indirectly. That is,
the rules may identify a system manager
who is empowered to decide on any or all
of these parameters. The rules may also
specify procedures or principles to be fol-
lowed when making the decision. For ex-
ample, many allocation rules specify that an
irrigation officer must determine the water
availability for a season and then must allo-
cate the available water to users according
to rules that give priority to some users
over others.
In addition, a water distribution rule
may specify the purpose for which the wa-
ter is to be used. The purpose may define a
condition under which water will not be de-
livered even if the allocation has been made.
For instance, if water is allocated to a farmer
to grow sorghum but he plants rice instead,
the system managers may be authorized to
refuse delivery of water to that farmer.
Characteristics. Water distribution rules
are statements in ordinary language. They
are subject to the problems and advantages
of ordinary language; they may be more or
less vague, more or less inclusive, etc. One
consequence is that the water distribution
rules can never cover all possible situations:
they necessarily abstract from reality to be
codified into language.
Water distribution rules for an irriga-
tion system form nested sets. There are gen-
erally multiple water distribution rules for
an irrigation system. Some define key pa-
rameters for the whole system during a
whole crop season. Others define the pa-
rameters for part of the season (e.g., during
the land preparation period) or for part of
the system (e.g., for the main system only).
The highest-level rules are allocation rules
that assign water to users. Lower-level rules
are scheduling or operation rules that define
how water is to be delivered according to
the allocations. Different rules in these sets
of rules may originate from different
sources, including law, agency regulations
(Radosevich 1986), and custom.
To be effective, water distribution rules
must be accepted as valid by most of the
interested persons, including those who
have the power to flout the rules for their
own benefit. In modern societies, getting
such acceptance usually means that at least
some of the rules must be codified into
written documents such as laws and
regulations. However, not all distribution
rules need to be formally codified; there
may be publicly accepted rules that are
passed on via word of mouth, even in the
largest systems (Ostrom, Gardner, and
Walker 1993).
Formal rules. Because there may be dif-
ferences of opinion among users or system
managers about the validity of rules, in this
report we restrict consideration to “formal”
water distribution rules. Formal rules are
defined as those that have been formally
adopted by a recognized sanctioning au-
thority, such as a national or local govern-
ment. Formal rules are codified, usually
written down in a recognized document,
and have enforcement mechanisms speci-
fied; that is, if the rule is broken an appro-
priate person can take actions to punish the
rule breaker or to change his actions.
When formal water distribution rules
are inappropriate, people may respond by
creating new and informal versions of the
rules. We will not treat such informal ver-
sions as water distribution rules. It is pos-
sible that, over time, informal rules will be-
come widely accepted and formalized.
Interactions of water distribution rules.
To understand the relations of the distribu-
tion rules to water distribution performance,4
we believe that it is important to identify all
the water distribution rules that apply to
the irrigation system. This is because rules
interact. For example, in the Tambraparani
Irrigation System, the rules for hydropower
generation strongly affect how system man-
agers follow the main system management
rules. When only one rule is studied in iso-
lation, it is quite likely that the implications
of the interactions will be missed.
Studies linking rules and
performance
In the scholarly literature, there has been
considerable discussion about the relation-
ship between water distribution rules and
water distribution performance. These dis-
cussions fall into four groups of studies.
A number of studies have used simula-
tion models to investigate which of several
distribution rules is best for some class of
irrigation systems (e.g., Anderson and
Maass 1987; Chaudhry and Young 1990;
Howe 1990; Kelley and Johnson 1990).
These studies necessarily simplify both the
rules and the situations in which they are
used so that the full consequences of a
given set of rules cannot be determined.
A second group comprises studies of
the distribution performance of irrigation
systems that refer to the consequences of
water distribution rules. For example,
Malhotra’s (1982) study of the warabandi
1
management system in Haryana describes
the water distribution rules and concludes
that they contribute to good performance.
In contrast, Palanisami (1984) finds that the
performance of the Lower Bhavani System
in Tamil Nadu is not good and that some of
the problems are caused by a rule for rotat-
ing water supplies among different groups
of farmers. These studies do not attempt to
separate the consequences of the rules from
the consequences of other aspects of system
management, such as the physical struc-
tures, information systems, and other facili-
ties for management.
The third group of studies focuses on
how or whether distribution rules are fol-
lowed. For example, Bandaragoda and
Rehman (1995) show that warabandi rules
are not being followed in parts of Pakistan
and conclude that the reason is poor main
system performance (cf. Lowdermilk 1990).
Similarly, Wade (1987) shows that many
farmer actions against the rules result from
the failure of the main system to deliver
water as it should. Vermillion (1986, 1991)
explains how and why farmers regularly
deviate from the rules. He argues that such
deviation is an effective adjustment of in-
flexible rules to varying local situations. The
studies in this group throw light on the
links between the rules and farmer behav-
ior, but they generally do not address the
consequences of this behavior for distribu-
tion performance; Vermillion’s studies are
an exception.
Finally, a recent group of studies ap-
proaches irrigation management as a case of
management of common pool resources
(Ostrom 1992; Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker
1993). These studies focus on explaining the
behavior of farmers and system managers,
but some may discuss system performance.
For example, Tang (1992, 1993) compares
performance evaluations and generalized
distribution rules in 47 irrigation systems.
Tang does not draw firm conclusions, but
his evidence suggests, among other things,
that a rule allocating water to farmers in
strict proportion to landholdings leads to
poorer performance than allocation to farm-
ers through multiple criteria. Tang’s study,
however, does not explain how differences
in rules lead to differences in performance.
The first two groups of studies explic-
itly or implicitly focus on the question:
1The narrow definition
of warabandi is a rota-
tional method for distri-
bution of the available
water in a part of an ir-
rigation system by turns
fixed according to a pre-
determined schedule
specifying the day, time,
and duration of supply
to each irrigator in pro-
portion to the size of his




term is used here in the
wider sense of the
whole distribution sys-
tem found in Northwest
India and Pakistan.5
what is the best set of distribution rules for
specific situations? The latter two groups
focus on why a set of rules works or does
not work. While all these studies are rel-
evant, none attempts to generalize about
how water distribution rules are related to
water distribution performance.
Perry (1995) offers a broad and persua-
sive hypothesis about the relation of water
distribution rules and system performance.
He argues that, if the physical infrastructure
and the management personnel are not ca-
pable of delivering water as specified by the
water distribution rules, the result will be
poor system performance. Following Perry’s
lead, we suggest that a general study of the
relation between water distribution rules
and water distribution performance should
focus not only on the internal characteristics
of the rules, but also on the factors to which
the rules must be adapted to result in good
water distribution performance.
Deficiencies in water distribution
rules
Mismatch between rules and farmers’ de-
sires. Farmers’ desires for irrigation services
are based on the crops that they want to
grow within the recognized limits of water
availability in the irrigation system. Water
distribution rules limit the quantity to be
supplied or the period of supply. Farmers’
crop choices are restricted to those crops
that can be grown with the water quantity
or schedule defined by the rules. If farmers
perceive an opportunity to grow a more
profitable crop outside the choices permit-
ted by the water distribution rules but
within the technical possibilities of the irri-
gation system, they can (a) submit to the
limitations imposed by the distribution
rules, (b) evade or subvert the rules, or (c)
attempt to change the rules.
If farmers submit to the rules, they re-
sign themselves to lower returns from irri-
gated agriculture than they believe they
could get otherwise. This outcome is unlikely
unless they perceive little difference in the
returns or see no opportunity to evade or
modify the water distribution rules.
Evasion or subversion of the rules is
likely, but both raise transaction costs. First,
evasion or subversion generally requires the
cooperation of the system managers; giving
gifts or making payments is a common way
to get managers’ cooperation. Not only does
this raise the cost of irrigation, it also may
force users to invest in actions to protect
their “rights.” Second, if the rules are
evaded or subverted, some users feel that
their water is going to others, resulting in
conflicts between farmers or between farm-
ers and the system managers.
Changing the rules would be the best
solution. However, the procedure for chang-
ing the rules may be difficult. Also, at-
tempts to change the rules may lead to con-
flicts among users with different interests
and between users and system managers
(e.g., Brewer 1996). Users may prefer to
evade or subvert the rules if they feel that
such actions have lower transaction costs
than changing the rules.
Farmers’ desires and the limitations of
the irrigation system. The overall water
availability and the technical features of an
irrigation system limit the possibilities of
water distribution. There is a need to ensure
that farmers understand the limits so that
they do not demand more than the system
can feasibly provide. Conflicts among farm-
ers and between farmers and system man-
agers may be exacerbated by farmers’ fail-
ure to understand the limitations of the irri-
gation system. We return to this point in the
last section of the report.
Inconsistency in the rules. Inconsistency
in the water distribution rules means that6
following one rule makes it difficult or im-
possible to follow one or more other rules.
Such inconsistencies are problems for the
system managers; they are generally forced
to choose which rule to follow in each cir-
cumstance. System managers’ actions are
supposed to be guided by the rules. If they
Location
The Tambraparani Irrigation System lies in
the Tambraparani basin at the southern tip
of India (fig. 1). The Tambraparani River
originates in the Western Ghat mountains
and flows southeastward 120 kilometers to
the Gulf of Mannar. Some of the bigger
tributaries of the river are Servalar,
cannot follow all the rules, this provides an
opening for criticism of their performance
and for others to influence their actions. In-
consistencies may also be problems for the
water users if the inconsistencies prevent
effective system operation.
Features of the Tambraparani Irrigation System
Manimuthar, Gadana, Pachaiyar, and
Chittar. The total registered command of the
Tambraparani Irrigation System is 34,934
hectares.
Historical development
Irrigation development in the Tambraparani
basin dates back several centuries. The
present system has grown by amalgamation
of previously independent parts.
Over several centuries, villagers in vari-
ous parts of the present command con-
structed tanks (small reservoirs) for irriga-
tion. Prior to the British period, seven
anicuts (diversion weirs) were built in the
Tambraparani River. Nine channels were
constructed to lead the water from these
anicuts to existing local tanks. Some chan-
nels also irrigated land directly. An eighth
anicut and two additional channels were
completed in 1868 during British times.
In the 1940s, the government con-
structed the Papanasam Reservoir for flood
control and hydroelectric power generation.
The reservoir is near the headwaters of the
river, but the Papanasam powerhouse is lo-
cated some distance downstream.
In 1958, the Tamil Nadu Public Works
Department constructed a reservoir on the
Manimuthar River, a tributary of the
FIGURE 1.
Location of Tambraparani Irrigation System.7
Tambraparani, to stabilize irrigation under
the Tambraparani Irrigation System and to
provide water to 349 tanks outside the sys-
tem.
In 1986, the Tamil Nadu Electricity
Board completed a reservoir on the Servalar
River, another tributary of the Tambra-
parani, and linked it to the Papanasam Res-
ervoir with a tunnel. A powerhouse was
constructed at the foot of the Servalar dam.
Over the centuries, formerly indepen-
dent tank and “run-of-the-river” diversion
systems in Tambraparani have been trans-
formed into a single mixed irrigation sys-
tem. Most of the water in the basin is now
captured in the three reservoirs or in reser-
voirs on other tributaries of the Tambra-
parani. The riverbed now serves as the
main channel of the system. From the river,
water is diverted by the 8 anicuts into 11
channels. Farmers irrigate directly from the
channels and indirectly from 187 tanks fed
by the channels. Figure 2 shows the main
features of the Tambraparani Irrigation Sys-
tem; these features are described in table 1.
Water resources
The Tambraparani catchment area receives
more than 4,000 millimeters of rainfall an-
nually, making the Tambraparani a peren-
nial river. Rains occur during both the
southwest monsoon (June-September) and
the northeast monsoon (October-December).
Rains in the command area fall during both
monsoons but are much lighter than in the
catchment. About 60 percent of the
command’s 752-millimeter mean annual
rainfall occurs during the northeast mon-
soon.
The channels of the Tambraparani Irri-
gation System are located on contours on
both sides of the river; the area between the
channel and the river forms the command.
Drainage water flows back into the river or
into a lower channel. About 13 percent of
discharge into the channels comes from re-
turn flows.
Groundwater is used for supplemental
irrigation when surface supplies are not suf-
ficient, particularly during April, May, and
TABLE 1
Components of the Tambraparani Irrigation System.
Channel Tanks Command area (ha)
Anicut Channel length (km) (no.) Direct Indirecta Total
Kodaimelalagian South Kodaimelalagian 8.64 - 357 - 357
North Kodaimelalagian 18.51 20 532 393 925
Nadhiyunni Nadhiyunni 11.55 - 1,053 - 1,053
Kannadian Kannadian 33.95 16 4,182 876 5,058
Ariyanayakipuram Kodagan 29.04 17 1,295 1,133 2,428
Palavoor Palayam 42.46 59 1,862 1,983 3,845
Suthamalli Tirunelveli 29.14 23 1,022 1,572 2,594
Marudur Marudur Melakkal 19.84 16 1,843 3,330 5,173
Marudur Keelakkal 17.92 15 1,202 1,952 3,154
Srivaikundam South Main 33.87 15 1,090 4,076 5,166
North Main 36.32 6 1,331 3,850 5,181
Total 187 15,769 19,165 34,934
aFrom tanks fed by channels.8
June. Groundwater use is increasing slowly,
particularly in the tail reach of the system.
Relatively high costs of well installation and
electrical connections have slowed the de-
velopment of groundwater. In addition, of-
ficials and farmers are concerned about sea-
water intrusion and both groups are reluc-
tant to make extensive use of groundwater.
Changing water uses
Since the completion of the Papanasam Res-
ervoir in the 1940s, major changes have oc-
curred in uses of water in the Tambraparani
Irrigation System.
Power generation. Water from Papa-
nasam and Servalar reservoirs is now used
for electrical power generation throughout
the year.
A new crop season. Traditionally, rice
was grown in the whole Tambraparani com-
mand during pishanam (October-March) and
kar (June-September) seasons. The system
was closed for repairs during the rainless
months of April and May, although releases
were made for nonagricultural purposes. In
the late 1950s, farmers near the tail of the
system began to agitate for permission to
plant crops during these months. In 1969,
the advance kar season, running from April
through July, was created. Today, in the
head and middle reaches of the system, rice
is cultivated during pishanam and kar sea-
sons. In the tail areas, rice is grown during
pishanam and advance kar seasons.
Banana and betel cultivation. Bananas
have become a major crop, particularly in
the tail of the system. The area devoted to
banana has grown from about 11 percent of
the registered command area in 1970 to 36
percent today (table 2). Betel has also be-
come an important crop, although it is
grown in a relatively small area in the tail.
Bananas and betel grow year-round; they
are not planted or harvested on a seasonal
schedule. Both crops require year-round
watering. During kar and pishanam sea-
sons, farmers generally do not irrigate ba-
nanas because the seepage from the rice
fields is sufficient. Problems arise during
the hot, rainless months of April and May
when no water is issued for rice cultivation
unless the area is under advance kar rice
FIGURE 2.
Features of the Tambraparani Irrigation System.
Source: Pundarikanthan et al. 1992.9
cultivation. If irrigation is not provided at
this time, the bananas are small and yields
are reduced 20 to 50 percent. Although
some banana and betel farmers use ground-
water or water remaining in system tanks
during this period, most depend upon de-
liveries from the canals.
Increased irrigated area. Although the
registered command—the area recognized
by the government as having rights to
irrigation water from the Tambraparani
Irrigation System—is 34,934 hectares, the
estimates of the area actually irrigated range
from 38,000 to over 41,000 hectares.
Industry. There has been significant in-
dustrial development around the city of
Tuticorin in the Tambraparani tail area. In
the early 1950s, only one plant drew water
from the river. At present, six major indus-
trial plants and a thermal power station
draw 48.3 million cubic meters of water an-
nually from the Tambraparani Irrigation
System. There also are smaller industrial
users of water located in various places in
the system.
Municipal water supply. Individuals
have long used the water in the
Tambraparani channels and system tanks
for their domestic needs. However, in the
1950s the only municipal use was by
Tuticorin city, which used 7 million cubic
meters annually. Now there are 48 munici-
pal water supply schemes drawing water
from the river, and several more are under
construction. The Tamil Nadu Water Supply
and Drainage Board estimates that the cur-
rent and proposed municipal water supply
schemes will require 25.5 million cubic
meters per year.
Because of these changes, the overall
demand for water has increased; the total
command area has grown at least 10 per-
cent, and industrial and municipal use has
increased from 2 percent to 14 percent of
the water releases from the reservoirs. Also,
there is now a large demand for water re-
leases year-round—including April and
May, the months when the system was tra-
ditionally closed—for municipal and indus-
trial uses, for advance kar rice, and for ba-
nana and betel cultivation. But the water
distribution rules for the Tambraparani Irri-
gation System do not match these changed
demands.
TABLE 2.
Area (ha) of rice and non-rice crops grown
during pishanam season.
Reach Command Bananas and
area Rice other cropsa
Head 2,335 1,195 1,140
Middle 13,925 12,880 1,045
Tail 18,674 8,374 10,300
Total 34,934 22,449 12,485
aNon-rice crops are overwhelmingly bananas during
pishanam season.10
The Tambraparani Irrigation System pro-
vides water for irrigation, power generation,
municipal water supplies, and industry. The
overall management of the system is corre-
spondingly complex. The main actors in
managing the system are the Public Works
Department, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board,
the district collectors, the water users asso-
ciations, and the farmers. Only the first
three are recognized in the formal water
distribution rules.
Public Works Department. The irriga-
tion wing of the Tamil Nadu’s Public Works
Department (PWD) (since October 1995
called the Water Resources Organization) is
responsible for operation and maintenance
of the Tambraparani Irrigation System ex-
cept for some items specifically under the
control of other entities. Operation and
maintenance of the system are the responsi-
bility of an executive engineer. He is as-
sisted by various subordinates, including
subdivisional officers, sectional officers, irri-
gation inspectors and laskars (gate opera-
tors). Laskars are the lowest-level PWD em-
ployees. Each laskar is responsible for the
operation of a channel head sluice or of all
the sluices within a reach of one of the
channels.
Tamil Nadu Electricity Board. The
Tamil Nadu Electricity Board operates the
Papanasam and Servalar reservoirs and
powerhouses. A divisional engineer is re-
sponsible for operations.
District collectors. The district collector,
who comes under Tamil Nadu’s Revenue
Department, is the highest civil authority
within a district. He plays important roles
in irrigation system management, mostly in
ratifying allocation and other decisions. Un-
til the 1970s, the whole Tambraparani Irriga-
tion System fell into Tirunelveli District.
Since then, the area has been divided into
the Tirunelveli-Kattabomman and Chidam-
baranar districts.
Water users associations. Unlike other
irrigation systems in India, the Tambra-
parani Irrigation System has a large number
of locally recognized water users associa-
tions (WUAs). The tail reach of the system
has 90 WUAs while the head and middle
reaches have 42. All have been formed
spontaneously by the farmers themselves.
Most are based on villages, but some are
based on channels, castes, or crops (banana
growers’ association, betel growers’ associa-
tion), or are politically affiliated. All deal
with water management; many carry out
operation and maintenance functions below
system tanks or on channels. Most have
other functions including lobbying to get
water to their channels or tanks. However,
despite their importance in system manage-
ment, there are no established occasions on
which the government officials and repre-
sentatives of the WUAs meet to discuss sys-
tem management issues.
Farmers. Individual farmers and infor-
mal farmer groups strongly influence key
aspects of system management. However,
the management system officially recognizes
individual farmers only through monthly
“irrigation grievances days” held by the dis-
trict collectors and at which individual
farmers are invited to present their prob-
lems.
Sources of Tambraparani water
distribution rules
Formally codified system distribution rules
are a feature of the management of large ir-
rigation systems in Tamil Nadu; sets of rules
have been prepared for all 18 major systems
in the state. Some—the “rules of regula-
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tion”—have been issued by the state cabinet
of ministers. Others are issued by the district
collector or by top-level PWD officials.
There are five major sets of water distri-
bution rules for the Tambraparani Irrigation
System.
• The Channel Operating Rules for the 11
channels were first prepared during the
nineteenth century; the most recent
amendments were made by the district
collector in 1935.
• Rules of Regulation for the Papanasam Res-
ervoir were first framed in 1960 and fi-
nally approved in 1977. It is expected
that the Papanasam rules of regulation
will be amended to incorporate opera-
tions of the Servalar Reservoir.
• Rules of Regulation for the Manimuthar
Reservoir were approved in 1966 and
amended in 1971 and in 1973.
• A 1969 letter from the PWD to the
Tirunelveli district collector specifies a
set of rules pertaining to authorization
for advance kar rice cultivation.
• PWD general operating manuals and
recorded decisions about the Tambra-
parani Irrigation System operations
over more than a century define rules
for handling many water distribution
decisions.
There are other formal water distribu-
tion rules that apply to small portions of the
irrigation system or to particular conditions.
These include, among others, the several
agreements under which the system sup-
plies water to industries and municipalities
and a 1987 government order permitting
special releases during April and May to
betel cultivators in the tail of the system.
Rather than explicate each set of rules sepa-
rately, we will summarize the rules concern-
ing the major functions of the system.
Water distribution rules for
nonagricultural purposes
Municipal and industrial distribution. Wa-
ter distribution for industrial and municipal
purposes is defined by agreements between
the government and the users. These agree-
ments are very specific, defining how much
water is to be supplied, when, and to what
place. For example, the agreement for the
Tuticorin industrial park specifies that the
system must deliver 20 million imperial gal-
lons per day (1.13 m
3/s) throughout the
year to Arumugamangalam Tank under the
North Main Channel. These agreements are
made with the state government. It is the
PWD’s duty, as the general manager of the
system, to implement the agreements.
Power generation. The Papanasam Res-
ervoir rules of regulation cover the opera-
tion of the reservoir for both power genera-
tion and irrigation purposes. These rules are
described later (under Rules for Irrigation
Scheduling and Operations). Rules have not
yet been framed for Servalar Reservoir.
However, as explained later, the two reser-
voirs are currently operated as one unit un-
der the Papanasam rules of regulation.
Water allocation rules for
irrigation
Basic principles. Irrigation distribution is
much more complicated than is distribution
for other uses. First, there are many more
users—thousands of farmers versus one hy-
dropower user and less than 100 municipal
and industrial users. Second, the total de-
mand is much higher because irrigation re-
quires a great deal of water. Third, high de-
mand means that the allocation rules must
provide ways to balance supply and de-
mand.12
Tambraparani irrigation allocation rules
are based on two principles:
• Water is allocated for irrigation for the
recognized crop seasons: pishanam, kar,
and advance kar.
• Irrigation water is allocated for rice cul-
tivation.
Allocations for irrigation are defined by
the authorization of irrigation of rice for a
location within the system for a particular
season. The amount of land that can be irri-
gated is defined by the needs of rice. For
Tambraparani, the quantity required by rice
is defined for each season; for kar and ad-
vance kar seasons PWD engineers use the
rule that a million cubic feet of water will
irrigate 6 acres of rice (equivalent to 11,646
m
3/ha).
2 Less water is required during
pishanam season when rainfall is heavier.
Pishanam season. The sources of
pishanam allocation rules are the Tamil
Nadu land classification rules and PWD
documented practices. Heavy rainfall en-
sures that sufficient water is available for
the whole command. Consequently, the
State of Tamil Nadu has classified the whole
command as having a right to irrigation
water for pishanam season irrespective of
water availability. This principle is also re-
flected in records of PWD practice. Thus,
there are only two allocation rules for
pishanam season:
• The season begins around mid-October
each year and ends during the follow-
ing March.
• During the season, the whole command
is allocated water for rice.
Kar season. The sources for kar season
allocation rules are PWD regulations and
documented practices. In contrast with
pishanam season, water is often not suffi-
cient for the whole command during kar
season, and allocation to different parts of
the command must be carried out each
year. District collectors are involved by state
law to safeguard the farmers’ interests. The
basic rules:
• Kar season begins on 1 June (formally
decided in a 1992 court decision) and
ends around 30 September each year.
• The PWD executive engineer is to au-
thorize areas for rice cultivation based
on the area that can be irrigated with
the available water. Areas are autho-
rized in priority order from the head of
the system downward.
• The allocation decision must be ratified
and publicized by the district collectors.
To make the allocation decision, the
PWD executive engineer assesses water
availability for kar season during the last
week of May, taking into account storage in
the main reservoirs and probable inflows.
The executive engineer then calculates the
area that can be irrigated with the estimated
available water using the factor of 6 acres
per million cubic feet of water. Cultivation
of irrigated rice is then authorized in areas
under channels beginning from the head-
most channel and moving down the system
until the calculated total area that can be
irrigated is reached. The executive engineer
selects a date for water release. For the first
areas authorized, this date must be about 1
June. He forwards his allocation decision to
the district collectors who ratify it to make
it official and then publicize it. The
executive engineer may go through this
procedure more than once if in his judg-
ment water availability improves during
June and July.
Advance kar season. The advance kar
season allocation rules are defined in a 1969
letter to the district collector from the PWD:
2In fact, the engineers
say their goal is to reach
7 acres per million cubic
feet of water (100 ha/
10
6 m
3), but they use the
figure reported here for
practical reasons. For
historical reasons, En-
glish units rather than
metric units are custom-
arily used in the water
distribution rules.13
• The command under the last four chan-
nels of the system (last two anicuts) is
divided into four explicitly defined pri-
ority subareas. The first priority area in-
cludes the land under the two largest
tanks in the South Main Channel com-
mand, whereas land under other tanks
in the same channel command fall into
the second or third priority areas. Land
under the North Main Channel is also
divided into first, second, and third pri-
ority areas. Land under the other two
channels is defined as the fourth prior-
ity area.
• On 15 March, the executive engineer is
to allocate water to these areas in prior-
ity order based on his estimate of water
availability for the season.
• Water allocated for the advance kar cul-
tivation must leave at least 500 million
cubic feet of water (19 million m
3)
available in the Papanasam Reservoir
on 1 June for kar season cultivation.
An additional rule, implied but not
stated in the 1969 letter, is that the advance
kar season begins on 1 April and ends
around the end of July. The rules do not re-
quire formal ratification of the allocation
decision by the district collector.
 Although there is less rainfall during
the advance kar season than during the kar
season, the PWD executive engineer uses
the same ratio of 6 acres per million cubic
feet of water to calculate the area that can
be irrigated.
Rules for irrigation scheduling
and operations
Once allocations are made, there is a need
to deliver the water according to a schedule.
In Tambraparani, scheduling is carried out
at three levels: along each of the 11 chan-
nels, on the main system (the river) to the
11 channels, and from the reservoirs. The
rules apply to all three seasons.
Scheduling along the channels. The 1935
Channel Operating Rules provide explicit
instructions for water deliveries along each
of the 11 channels. For example, the operat-
ing rules for the Nadhiyunni Channel at the
second anicut specify that water delivery is
to be by a 5-day turn system that rotates
water among four defined subareas. De-
tailed times for starting delivery for each
area and the duration of the delivery are
given. The rules also specify the levels to be
maintained at key points and indicate
where temporary dams are to be erected.
For channels that have system tanks, the
rules specify the order of filling of the tanks.
Scheduling on the main system. Sched-
uling of water deliveries to the channels is
defined through PWD regulations and oper-
ating principles. The basic principle is that
demand for each channel is to be deter-
mined every day, and flows in the main
system are to be adjusted daily to meet the
demands. It is assumed that the allocation
rules have ensured that there is enough wa-
ter for the season and that the daily de-
mands are evaluated correctly.
To implement the basic principle, PWD
operating rules require the laskars on each
channel to survey and keep track of the
crop conditions under the channel. Every
day, each laskar who operates a channel
head gate is required to estimate the water
needed by the crops served by his channel.
Each morning, he is supposed to forward
his demand estimate to the executive engi-
neer through the PWD hierarchy. The execu-
tive engineer then is to issue orders for gate
settings at the reservoirs, channel heads,
etc., to match the combined demands. These
orders are to be passed down through the
hierarchy to the laskars responsible for op-
erating the control structures.14
Besides the general operating rules,
there are more specific operating rules.
Water is to be delivered to the channels
continuously for the first 2 weeks of each
season for seedbed preparation and
planting. After the first 2 weeks, water is to
be delivered continuously to the channels if
enough is available or else the water is to be
rotated among channels on a schedule set
by the executive engineer. Rotational
deliveries should be made first to the
channels with large areas under system
tanks so that those responsible for the
system tanks can handle irrigation needs
during off periods. To conserve water,
deliveries are to be reduced appropriately
when rain falls.
PWD freedom to deviate from the rules.
The executive engineer has considerable
freedom to deviate from rules and
schedules. The Channel Operating Rules
explicitly authorize the executive engineer
to modify operations within the channels as
he judges necessary. Also, a 1938 instruction
from the chief engineer, irrigation, of the
PWD permits the executive engineer to
modify schedules to protect crops that are
“in immediate danger of withering.”
Operation of the Papanasam and
Servalar reservoirs. The Papanasam Reser-
voir rules of regulation define the operation
of the reservoir for irrigation as well as
power generation:
• Papanasam Reservoir operation is as-
signed to the TNEB divisional engineer.
Operation of the powerhouse is as-
signed to the TNEB by state law.




throughout the year. This flow is the
maximum intake of the powerhouse.
• The TNEB is permitted to impound
flows above 1,400 cusecs in the reser-
voir for later use.
• Irrigation requirements from 1 to 15
June are 1,650 cusecs (46.7 m
3/s), and
from 16 June through 31 March they are
2,300 cusecs (65.1 m
3/s). Inflows to
these limits are allocated to irrigation,
but inflows above these limits are allo-
cated to the TNEB for power genera-
tion. Accounting is to be done monthly.
• The PWD executive engineer may re-
quest the TNEB divisional engineer to
release the water allocated to irrigation,
after deducting water lost through
evaporation, whenever needed for irri-
gation.
• Because the maximum intake into the
Papanasam powerhouse is 1,400 cusecs,
discharges into the river from the reser-
voirs are “generally” limited to that
rate.
All releases are actually made from the
Servalar Reservoir, as explained later.
Operation of the Manimuthar Reser-
voir. The Manimuthar River joins the
Tambraparani at the Kannadian Anicut (the
third anicut). The Manimuthar Reservoir on
the Manimuthar River serves the dual pur-
pose of providing irrigation water to 349
tanks in its own command and of regulat-
ing supplies for the Tambraparani Irrigation
System. The PWD executive engineer for
Tambraparani is responsible for operating
the Manimuthar Reservoir. The Rules of
Regulation for the Manimuthar Reservoir
divide water between the two systems.
The amount of Manimuthar River wa-
ter that can be drawn upon for the
Tambraparani Irrigation System is limited to
an annual total of 51 million cubic meters.
The remainder of the Manimuthar water is
to be used for the Manimuthar Reservoir
command through the High Level Canal.
When the Tambraparani River flow at
the Kannadian Anicut exceeds specified
limits for different periods of the year, the
3Cubic feet per second.
The numbers given in
the water distribution




full flow in the Manimuthar River is to be
impounded in the reservoir for the
Manimuthar command.
If the flow at the Kannadian Anicut is
less than the specified limits, the deficit is to
be made up from the natural flow of the
Manimuthar River. The remainder of the
Manimuthar River flow, if any, is to be
impounded in the reservoir for the Mani-
muthar command.
If the flow at the Kannadian Anicut is
less than the specified limits but water is not
needed in the lower portions of the Tambra-
parani command, then the executive engi-
neer may choose to impound the Manimuthar
River water that would go to Tambraparani in
the reservoir and draw upon it for the
Tambraparani command at a later time.
Deficiencies in the distribution
rules
The Tambraparani water distribution rules
have two major deficiencies: they are inter-
nally inconsistent,
4 and they define a pat-
tern of water deliveries that does not match
the goals of a large group of users.
Inconsistencies in the rules. According
to the rules, flows in the main system are to
be adjusted daily to meet demands from the
channels. However, the rules for operating
the channels rigidly prescribe delivery
schedules and levels to be maintained.
Rigid schedules with varying flows mean
that those lucky enough to get their turns
when flow is high get extra water while
those whose turns come when flow is low
get little. This inconsistency forces the
laskars responsible for operation of the
channels to choose whether to ignore the
channel operating rules or to frame their
demands to facilitate operating the channel
according to the rules. In the latter case,
their ability to implement the channel oper-
ating rules depends upon the ability of the
main system managers to deliver water ac-
cording to demand.
The Papanasam Reservoir rules of regu-
lation say that discharge from the reservoir
is to be “generally” limited to the 1,400
cusecs (39.6 m
3/s) that can be used by the
Papanasam powerhouse even though this is
far below the maximum irrigation demand.
The rules also place some water in the res-
ervoir under the control of the PWD execu-
tive engineer to meet irrigation demands
above the 1,400 cusecs. He cannot use this
water unless reservoir releases exceed 1,400
cusecs. If the TNEB, which operates the
Papanasam and Servalar reservoirs, insists
on interpreting the term “generally” to re-
strict the releases to 1,400 cusecs, the ability
of the PWD executive engineer to respond
to daily demands from the laskars is se-
verely limited.
The Manimuthar Reservoir rules of
regulation say that the Manimuthar River
flows are to be used to assure sufficient
flow in the Tambraparani River. The rules
also set an absolute annual limit of 51 mil-
lion cubic meters of water that may be
taken from the Manimuthar Reservoir for
the Tambraparani Irrigation System. If flows
in the Tambraparani River are low, it may
not be possible to satisfy both of these rules.
Either Manimuthar River water will be used
for the Manimuthar command and flow
will not be maintained in the Tambraparani
River or the limit of contribution of
Manimuthar River water to the Tambra-
parani Irrigation System will be exceeded.
The first case may deprive Tambraparani
farmers of expected water; the second may
deprive Manimuthar command farmers.
The flow in the Tambraparani River is
determined to a large extent by releases from
the Papanasam and Servalar reservoirs.
Thus, the more strictly a limit on Papanasam
Reservoir releases is observed, the greater the
4In his comments on a
draft version of this pa-
per, S. G. Narayana-
murthy pointed out that
water distribution rules
must satisfy certain con-
sistency and informa-
tion conditions: (1) rules
should be consistent
with the objectives of
the system, (2) rules
should be consistent
with the rules at higher
levels in the hierarchy,
(3) each rule must be
based on information
likely to be available for
decision making when
the rule is to be applied,
(4) discretion granted by
a rule to a decision
maker should be limited
to competence likely to
be available at that
point, (5) the range of
possible version deci-
sions should be one that
can be implemented
with reasonable faithful-
ness on the physical sys-
tem, and (6) the rules
must be seen to be tak-




probability that one or the other Manimuthar
Reservoir rule will be broken.
Mismatch with farmers’ goals. Many
farmers plant bananas because they are far
more profitable than rice (Pundarikanthan
et al. 1992). But the rules make no provision
for allocating water to bananas although the
crop occupies over a third of the command.
Bananas require year-round water delivery,
particularly in April and May, rather than
delivery only during two rice seasons. Sat-
isfying the desire for water for bananas is
perceived as feasible because the total water
requirement for bananas is less than the
water requirement for two rice crops
(Pundarikanthan et al. 1992). All that is
needed is a change in delivery schedules.
Change as the cause of the deficiencies.
Both types of deficiencies are products of
the changes undergone by the Tambra-
parani Irrigation System over time. As the
system grew, government authorities codi-
fied water distribution rules for various
parts of the system without careful consid-
eration of existing rules, leading to inconsis-
tencies.
The mismatch of the rules with the
farmers’ goals is also a product of the shift-
ing opportunities for agricultural produc-
tion without concomitant changing of the
rules.
Flexibility in the water
distribution rules
Water distribution rules must allow for ad-
aptation of distribution to varying water
supply, water demand, and other condi-
tions.
The Tambraparani rules provide flexibility
by:
• Specifying that the PWD executive en-
gineer makes seasonal allocations for
kar and advance kar seasons based on
his estimate of water availability in the
season.
• Specifying that the main system deliv-
eries to each channel are to be set each
day to meet channel demand as speci-
fied by the laskars. Actual deliveries are
specified by the executive engineer’s
office.
• Permitting the executive engineer to
change channel operations as he feels is
necessary.
• Giving the executive engineer power to
issue water to crops “in danger of with-
ering.”
• Giving the TNEB divisional engineer
power to release water from the
Papanasam Reservoir as needed for hy-
dropower generation.
• Giving the PWD executive engineer
power to divide Manimuthar River wa-
ter between the Manimuthar command
and the Tambraparani Irrigation Sys-
tem.
Obviously the flexibility lies almost en-
tirely in the hands of the PWD executive
engineer. Most decisions rest on his judg-
ment alone. Under the rules, he is not an-
swerable to the users; he is answerable only
to his superiors within the PWD. While
these rules provide flexibility, they also al-
low the executive engineer and his advisors
considerable scope for abuse or incompetent
execution of the rules.17
We have pointed out that there are major
inconsistencies in the water distribution
rules and that the rules define a pattern of
water deliveries that does not match the
farmers’ goals. In addition, we have hy-
pothesized that, if the water distribution
rules do not match technically feasible goals
of the users, then the users, often in coop-
eration with system managers, will modify
or subvert the rules to bring water delivery
into accordance with their desires. We also
hypothesized that inconsistencies in the
rules will cause difficulties in operations.
This section shows that both hypotheses are
true for the Tambraparani Irrigation System.
Reservoir operations
To deliver water to the channels as required
for irrigation, the PWD executive engineer
has to draw the required flows from the res-
ervoirs, primarily the Papanasam and
Servalar reservoirs. The required discharge
varies daily, but, during kar and advance
kar seasons, the required discharge from the
reservoirs can be well above 2,000 cusecs
(56.6 m
3/s).
The Papanasam and Servalar reservoirs
are operated by the divisional engineer of
TNEB. The Papanasam Reservoir operating
rules allocate some inflow into the reser-
voirs to irrigation and specify that the PWD
executive engineer can request the water
from TNEB’s divisional engineer when
needed.
The TNEB interest is power generation;
it wants all available water to flow through
the two powerhouses to generate electricity.
To generate power, the board runs water
from the Papanasam Reservoir through the
tunnel connecting the two reservoirs and
makes all releases through the Servalar
powerhouse. The water flows down the
Servalar River to its confluence with the
Tambraparani River and then flows through
the Papanasam powerhouse below the
confluence. In this way, the TNEB uses all
the water in both reservoirs to generate
power twice.
Although the Servalar powerhouse in-
take can handle up to 2,200 cusecs (62.3
m
3/s), the older Papanasam powerhouse in-
take can handle only 1,400 cusecs. If the
TNEB divisional engineer releases more
than 1,400 cusecs, the excess will spill over
the Papanasam powerhouse weir without
generating electricity. To prevent this, the
TNEB has ordered its divisional engineer
not to allow water over the Papanasam
powerhouse diversion weir without written
permission from the TNEB chairman in Ma-
dras.
These operating practices prevent the
flexible use of reservoir water for irrigation
as required by the main system operating
rules. Even if the TNEB chairman is willing
to give permission for releases exceeding
1,400 cusecs, it takes time to get the permis-
sion, making it impossible to deliver irriga-
tion water responsively in periods of heavy
demand. In practice, the TNEB divisional
engineer occasionally permits spilling of
water over the Papanasam powerhouse di-
version weir for a day or two. This practice
softens the effects of the restriction but does
not overcome them.
When the required discharge for irriga-
tion is not available from the Papanasam
powerhouse weir, the PWD executive engi-
neer is forced to use the Manimuthar River
water to meet the shortage as specified in
the Manimuthar Reservoir rules. However,
the Manimuthar rules also limit the total
annual draw from the Manimuthar River
for the Tambraparani Irrigation System to
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51 million cubic meters. The remainder of
the water is to be used for 349 tanks fed
through the Manimuthar High Level Canal.
Yet, because of restrictions of flow from the
upper reservoirs, the executive engineer
generally has to use more than the limit for
the Tambraparani Irrigation System. The
Manimuthar River water used for the
Tambraparani Irrigation System has ex-
ceeded the limit of 51 million cubic meters
in 22 out of the 34 years before 1993. As a
result of supplying water for the Tambra-
parani command, the Manimuthar Reser-
voir has frequently not had a high enough
level to provide water for the Manimuthar
High Level Canal command. That is, the
Manimuthar command has been starved to
provide water for the Tambraparani com-
mand.
Main system operations
The distribution rules require PWD officials
to adapt water deliveries to demand every
day. The only major variation is that deliv-
eries are reduced following rainfall. How-
ever, the daily operating decisions are only
as good as the information on which they
are based.
Information on crops and cropped area
is not good. Laskars are supposed to survey
the crops and report areas under each crop
and areas irrigated. In fact, most of them
use the figures collected by the Revenue
Department officers.
Information on the area under bananas
is particularly suspect. Because advance kar
water issues are meant only for rice, laskars
are reluctant to report that bananas are be-
ing irrigated. Because banana area figures
from the laskars cannot be trusted, the area
under banana in the lower reaches of the
system is estimated from demands for spe-
cial releases for water. Also, when calculat-
ing water demand for the kar season, the
executive engineer’s office ignores the area
under bananas.
Information on water flows is scanty;
discharges are measured only at the reser-
voirs, the anicuts, and the heads of the
channels.
Because of reuse, the quantity of water
let into the channels is always greater that
the quantity released from the reservoirs.
However, return flow is ignored in daily
decision making.
Rainfall figures are collected each week
from five gauging stations in the command.
These figures are useless for daily opera-
tional adjustments. Therefore, responses to
rainfall are based purely on the observa-
tions and local judgment of each subdivi-
sional officer.
Laskars’ reports of gauge readings at
channel heads and their demands for water
releases are communicated to higher-level
PWD officers daily via canal phones. The
only records routinely kept are the laskars’
field books in which discharges at the
anicuts and channel heads are recorded.
These practices give great power to the
laskars. Although decisions about daily de-
liveries to the channels are made by higher-
level PWD officials, those decisions are
based on demands for irrigation water that
originate from the laskars. These demands
are justified by crop and water information
that also originates from the laskars. Only
the laskars keep records of deliveries. There-
fore, there is no way to check the cumula-
tive amount delivered to each channel
against the amount allocated for the season.
Even if records were kept, the rule requiring
that standing crops be saved from damage
would prevent PWD officials from cutting
off water to a channel.
On the other hand, PWD officials have
major difficulties satisfying the laskars’ de-
mands because of the restrictions on dis-19
charge from the reservoirs. Main system
operating decisions are daily compromises
between what the laskars demand and what
is possible in view of the restrictions on
river flow. As a result the main system wa-
ter deliveries are not predictable.
For example, all PWD personnel try to
keep water flowing into the Nadhiyunni
Channel continuously during kar and
pishanam seasons because there are no
tanks to provide water to the crops when
there is none flowing in the channel. Table 3
shows that the PWD is unsuccessful. In the
South Main Channel, actual operations also
differ widely from the nominal pattern
(table 3). The operating plan for the last
anicut is to deliver water alternately to the
South Main Channel and to the North Main
Channel for 7 days each. In fact, water is
diverted into both channels when the level
at the anicut is high and there is need for
water in the tanks fed by these channels.
Operation of the channels
Although the Channel Operating Rules give
detailed rules for water distribution along
the channels, actual distribution is quite dif-
ferent. The key actors in deciding how wa-
ter is distributed are the laskars, the farm-
ers, and the water users associations.
Laskars and farmers. Laskars are re-
sponsible for operating gates to distribute
water along the channels. The rigid Channel
Operating Rules would seem to greatly
limit the decision-making powers of laskars.
But, in fact, laskars are loosely supervised.
They have few direct supervisors, and the
supervisors rarely visit the field or notice
deviations from the rules. Laskars use their
freedom of action to respond to farmer re-
quests for water. In return, farmers make
gifts of rice and other items to the laskars,
and sometimes pay them for service. Farm-
ers also become involved in distribution of
TABLE 3.
Examples of main system operations.
Nominal Range of Design Actual
operations turn length Delivery days discharge discharges
Channel Season pattern (days) (days) /total days (cusecs) (cusecs)
Nadhiyunni 1992 kar continuous 2–35 124/154 95 30–79
1992–93 pishanam continuous 3–20 102/168 95 44–95
South Main 1992–93 pishanam 7 on, 7 off 17–33 68/168 n.a. n.a.
1993 advance kar 7 on, 7 off 3–31 75/~125a n.a. n.a.
aIn addition, releases totaling 14 days were made in August for “domestic purposes.”
water through direct action, such as by
pumping water from canals. Direct action,
too, requires the cooperation of the laskar
because he is empowered to stop it or to re-
port the farmers to the authorities who can
fine them.
For example, PWD regulations say that
the one laskar assigned to the Nadhiyunni
Channel is supposed to travel the length of
the canal each day to adjust gates according
to the Channel Operating Rules. Instead, the
laskar visits and adjusts gates only after be-
ing called by a farmer. The Nadhiyunni
farmers report that a laskar who retired in
1994 used to demand Rs 100 to adjust a
gate (the present laskar does not demand
money for this service).
Despite such demands, most farmers
look upon the laskar as the person res-
ponsible for getting sufficient water; many
farmers develop close associations with the
laskar. Farmers who are faced with water20
problems come to the laskar for solutions.
The laskar generally tries to get enough
water to satisfy the farmers of the channel
through the daily demands he sends to his
superiors. By adjusting gates as requested,
he attempts to apportion the available water
in such a way that most farmers are satis-
fied. In return for this service, farmers give
rice to the laskar at the end of the season.
The Nadhiyunni Channel laskar is esti-
mated to collect 1,000 to 1,500 kilograms of
rice per season, an amount equivalent to
more than half his PWD annual salary.
There are eight laskars assigned to
South Main Channel at the last anicut. The
laskars are responsible for operating the
sluices from the channels to the tanks and
to the direct command area; they are not
responsible for distribution of water below
the system tanks or below the direct sluices.
Distribution in these areas is handled by
water users associations (WUAs) or by the
farmers themselves. As in the Nadhiyunni
Channel, farmers who get water directly
from the channel go to the laskars for help
when they have problems. WUA leaders go
to the laskars to get water for their tanks.
In return for help, farmers voluntarily
give gifts to the laskars. Most give rice
through the WUAs. Farmers report that
WUAs give the laskars 35 to 70 kilograms of
unhusked rice each season and that indi-
vidual farmers in the direct command give
3 to 5 kilograms of unhusked rice or a couple
of bunches of bananas each season. When the
actions requested of the laskar are clearly
against the rules, laskars may demand cash
or farmers may offer it. Direct command
farmers report paying cash to the laskar to
close a cross regulator against the rules. Oth-
ers report paying a laskar to provide water
during April and May for unauthorized land
or to overlook pumping from the channel.
Loyalty of the laskars. Gifts and pay-
ments to laskars are an old practice. In parts
of Tamil Nadu, including areas under many
of the system tanks in Tambraparani, irriga-
tors are appointed and paid by farmers.
Generally, these irrigators are paid part of
the rice harvest. Hence, gifts of rice to
laskars can be viewed as a continuation of
traditional irrigation practices. Today,
laskars encourage the practice. During infor-
mal talks, a number of laskars expressed
strong dissatisfaction with the PWD over
pay, retirement benefits, and traveling al-
lowances. Laskars feel they have good rea-
sons for choosing to work with farmers. The
current pressure on the water supply has
resulted in increasing the laskars’ impor-
tance as a means for getting water. One re-
sult is that many farmers feel they now
have to pay to be sure they get their water.
Water users associations. WUAs help
acquire and distribute water for their areas,
undertake channel maintenance, and take
on other functions. WUAs generally cooper-
ate with laskars to get water for system
tanks and for canals in the direct command.
For example, there are three village-based
WUAs in the Nadhiyunni Channel com-
mand. All take active roles in management,
particularly in channel maintenance. The
two WUAs located at the tail of the channel
provide labor for cleaning the upper por-
tions of the Nadhiyunni Channel to get wa-
ter to their areas.
There are about 35 WUAs in the South
Main Channel command. Most are based on
villages, although some include more than
one village and some villages do not have a
WUA. One WUA is an association of betel
farmers. Some WUAs are based on tanks.
WUAs are totally responsible for water dis-
tribution from the 15 tanks in the command;
they maintain the tank systems, help in ob-
taining water for the tanks, and undertake
other activities. The few WUAs in the direct
channel command work with laskars to get
water.21
WUAs take part in conflicts over water,
particularly conflicts among farmers from
different tanks. For example, during periods
of shortage, the Ammanpuram Tank WUA
organizes farmers to block the sluice of the
Natham Tank supply channel. During short-
age periods, other WUAs hire guards to pa-
trol their supply channels to prevent such
occurrences. A recent major conflict oc-
curred between farmers of the Kadamba
Tank and farmers of 12 tanks fed through
the Kadamba Tank. To help in delivering
water to these tanks, the PWD proposed
building a channel to bypass the Kadamba
Tank. To defend the Kadamba Tank’s privi-
leged position, the Kadamba Tank Protec-
tion Council was formed in 1991. This coun-
cil took members’ concerns to court while
the WUAs from the downstream tanks de-
fended the bypass. In a verdict rendered in
1994, the court allowed construction of the
bypass but required measures to safeguard
the rights of the Kadamba Tank farmers.
Relevance of the Channel Operating
Rules. Clearly, the detailed Channel Operat-
ing Rules for distributing water along the
channels have little relevance to actual op-
erations on the channels. Laskars and farm-
ers make the operating decisions in re-
sponse to immediate needs. This is a logical
response to the unpredictability of deliver-
ies to the channels by the main system.
Water allocations in practice
Seasonal allocations. The rules say that all
of the Tambraparani command is allocated
water for rice during pishanam season. Ac-
cording to PWD records, from 1971–72
through 1992–93, all 34,934 hectares of the
registered area had been irrigated and har-
vested during pishanam season.
The rules for kar season say that the
PWD executive engineer makes an initial
allocation before the season and then can
add to the allocation later if he finds that
water availability has improved. During
May 1993, for example, the PWD autho-
rized kar season irrigation for 7,290 hectares
under the first four channels, with issues
beginning on 1 June. An additional area of
2,429 hectares under the fifth channel was
authorized, and issues began on 19 July.
Based on further improved storage levels,
issues were begun on 23 July for the sixth
channel (1,417 ha) and part of the seventh
channel (810 ha). No additional area was
authorized for kar 1993.
Adding to the kar season allocations is
common: PWD records show that it was
done eight times from 1979 through 1992.
Over this 14-year period, the average ini-
tially authorized area was 19,974 hectares,
but the average final authorized area was
25,121 hectares. Government records indi-
cate that the areas authorized are very close
to the areas harvested.
The rules for advance kar season say
that the PWD executive engineer is to allo-
cate water for rice to specific areas in the
tail of the system in a defined priority order.
PWD records show that the authorized area
for advance kar season varies greatly. From
1977 to 1989, advance kar authorizations
ranged from 0 to 18,660 hectares and aver-
aged 5,167 hectares.
However, advance kar season alloca-
tions are heavily influenced by the farmers
in the tail area, and the actual area irrigated
is likely to be much greater than authorized.
For example, official government figures for
1994–95, a year with above-normal water
availability, show that advance kar rice was
authorized for the maximum area in the
South Main Channel permitted by the
rules—4,500 hectares. Official figures show
that rice was planted in the whole 5,166-
hectare command of the South Main Chan-
nel along with over 2,800 hectares of ba-22
nanas (table 4). Interviews with farmers
suggest that rice was planted in less than
the reported area.
The total area officially reported under
advance kar rice in the last four channels
was 11,127 hectares (table 4), somewhat less
than the 13,617 hectares officially authorized
for advance kar for these channels. But the
sum of the banana areas under the last four
channels and the reported advance kar rice
areas is 19,777 hectares, well above the au-
thorized area.
If these figures are correct, they imply
that a much larger area was irrigated dur-
ing advance kar than was authorized. It
may also be that the rice area is exagger-
ated, as it seems to have been for South
Main Channel, to conceal the advance kar
water issues used for bananas. Possibly
both are true: more area was irrigated than
was authorized and the rice areas were pad-
ded to justify the authorizations.
Solving shortages in the tail. Bananas
and betel are concentrated in the tail of the
system; hence in these areas the demand for
year-round water is greatest. During
pishanam season, the channels get adequate
TABLE 4.
Crop area (ha) reported by the government in the Tambraparani Irrigation System, 1994–95.
Registered Rice area Kar
Anicut Channel command Pishanam Kar Advance kar Bananas pulsesa
Kodaimelalagian South Kodaimelalagian 357 348 348 - 38 -
North Kodaimelalagian 925 904 904 - 65 -
Nadhiyunni Nadhiyunni 1,053 984 984 - 28 -
Kannadian Kannadian 5,058 5,000 5,000 - 275 -
Ariyanayakipuram Kodagan 2,428  2,400 2,208 - - -
Palavoor Palayam 3,845 3,800 3,525 - 35 -
Suthamalli Tirunelveli 2,594 2,564 2,564 - - -
Marudur Marudur Melakkal 5,173 2,150 - 2,200 1,350 1,850
Marudur Keelakkal 3,154 1,550 - 1,600 510 1,260
Srivaikundam South Main 5,166 5,436 - 5,166 2,854 -
North Main 5,181 3,373 - 2,161 3,936 -
Total 34,934 28,509 15,533 11,127 9,091 3,110
aNonirrigated.
irrigation water to supplement the northeast
monsoon rains. But during the rest of the
year, particularly from April to June when
rain seldom falls, water is often scarce.
Shortages are met by getting special re-
leases, through pumping, and by getting
advance kar allocations.
Mobilizing pressure for special releases
of water during shortage periods is a major
function of the WUAs. Examples are a re-
quest by betel growers for special releases
for their crops under a 1987 government or-
der, a request by farmers under the Avu-
dayar Tank for special releases for the
Thiruchendur Temple, and requests for spe-
cial releases for “domestic purposes,” i.e.,
drinking water. In all cases, the water is
used for standing crops, particularly betel
and banana.
When special releases are required, the
WUAs under each tank meet and fix the
contribution each farmer has to make. Rates
are determined by the intensity of the prob-
lem and the likely expenditure. Generally,
the rate is Rs 1 per banana plant or Rs 150
per acre (Rs 370/ha) of betel or banana.
These funds are used to send WUA leaders23
to Tirunelveli and Madras to persuade leg-
islators and senior bureaucrats to grant spe-
cial releases, sometimes through gifts to
these individuals.
Because groundwater use is unregu-
lated, pumping groundwater is a solution
for farmers who have access to wells with
good quality water. However, few farmers
have good quality groundwater. The alter-
native, pumping from the canal, diminishes
flows intended for other uses such as indus-
try or the special releases. Consequently,
such pumping is against the rules, but can
be done with the collaboration of the
laskars. To supply 40 cusecs (1.13 m
3/s) of
water to the Tuticorin industrial park, the
PWD releases 150 to 160 cusecs (4.25 to 4.53
m
3/s) of water at the channel head every
day. Most of the transmission losses are the
result of over 300 farmers pumping water
from the North Main Channel.
Requesting advance kar allocations is a
major way of getting water for bananas in
the tail of the system. To influence seasonal
allocations, WUAs in the tail area send del-
egations to persuade government officials to
authorize advance kar issues, particularly
for second and third priority lands. The
water is used for betel and banana crops al-
though it is ostensibly released for rice. For
example, in 1993, in the South Main Chan-
nel, the WUAs under six tanks on third pri-
ority land sent a farmer related to a member
of Parliament to visit officials at district and
state level. Through his connections, he con-
vinced the state minister of the PWD to
grant advance kar authorization for these
six tanks.
Tail-end WUAs spend a considerable
amount of money to get advance kar alloca-
tions or special releases to get water to their
tanks during the shortage period. A leading
farmer who is also a senior government of-
ficial, estimates that one WUA annually col-
lects Rs 65,000 to Rs 135,000 for this pur-
pose. Of this, 20 percent is shared by the
WUA leaders, 65 percent is distributed to
officials at different levels, and the rest is
spent on travel and other expenses. WUAs
generally provide water obtained through
such interventions only to farmers who con-
tribute to the fund.
The WUAs also threaten or carry out
public demonstrations to influence govern-
ment officials. A popular means is to block
a highway, particularly when an important
official is scheduled to pass. In 1992, block-
ing a minister’s car resulted in a special re-
lease desired by the farmers.
Through these means, the tail farmers
have been generally successful in getting
water for their banana and betel crops.
There have been no reports of major crop
failures despite widely varying allocations
for advance kar cultivation.
Conflict over seasonal allocations. The
success of the tail farmers in getting water
has become a recognized problem for head
and middle area farmers. Excess allocations
for advance kar limit the amount of water
available during kar season (Pundari-
kanthan et al. 1992) and special releases de-
liver more water to the tail than is allocated.
Kar season allocation rules give priority
to the channels at the head of the system.
However, farmers who receive advance kar
allocations are able to get their crops in the
ground before June when farmers in the
head areas are just beginning kar season
cultivation. If a water shortage occurs in
June or July when the two seasons overlap,
the tail areas get priority for water because
they have endangered crops already in the
ground. Thus, advance kar allocations re-
verse the traditional priority for allocation
of water during these months. The reversal
of priorities was probably the major factor
in motivating tail farmers to agitate for ad-
vance kar allocations 40 years ago, even be-
fore bananas or betel became major crops.24
In 1987, the Three Channel Association,
representing the farmers of the first three
channels of the Tambraparani Irrigation Sys-
tem was formed specifically to protect the
allocation priority of the head area channels.
The association filed charges alleging that
the district collector and the PWD issued
more water to the tail areas for advance kar
than was allowed by the rules. They
claimed that this practice resulted in the
delay of issues for kar cultivation. A 1992
court judgment dismissed the farmers’ alle-
gations but ordered that water must be re-
served for kar water releases as specified in
the 1969 rules and that kar releases for the
first three channels must begin on 1 June.
These were the key points the head area
farmers were fighting for.
Making water deliveries match
goals
In Tambraparani, to allocate and deliver
water as desired by farmers, various offi-
cials and farmers ignore and subvert the
water distribution rules for irrigation.
Among them are
• farmers and laskars who collaborate to
serve the farmers’ interests against
other farmers or against the distribution
rules
• farmers who, through their WUAs, put
political and other pressure on govern-
ment officials to authorize advance kar
irrigation or to sanction special releases
to get water to irrigate their bananas
and betel
• system managers who cooperate with
these farmers
Also the purposes of the water distribu-
tion rules are subverted by some system
managers, such as the Tamil Nadu Electric-
ity Board, which tries to prevent water re-
leases for irrigation that do not generate
electricity, and the PWD officials who issue
water from the Manimuthar Reservoir to
serve the needs of the Tambraparani Irriga-
tion System against the clear intent of pro-
viding water for the Manimuthar Reser-
voir’s own command.
Because of the evasions and subversion
of the rules, the agricultural output of the
Tambraparani Irrigation System is better,
from the point of view of some farmers,
than it would be if water were delivered ac-
cording to the rules. Sticking to the rules
would severely damage the banana and be-
tel crops and would probably reduce the
total value of the crops. Bananas produce
significantly higher per hectare cash returns
than do two rice crops. Pundarikanthan et
al. (1992) estimate that in 1991 income from
each rice crop was Rs 6,250/ha—or Rs
12,500/ha per year—while bananas pro-
duced an income of Rs 40,500/ha per year.
Also, the actions of the laskars, farmers,
and WUAs in managing channel operations
against the rules compensate in part for the
main system delivery deficiencies and may
keep rice yields higher than they might be
otherwise.
Presumably, the TNEB restrictions on
reservoir releases also have a benefit: they
may help maintain power production when
river flows are at their lowest.25
Water delivery performance
Water delivery performance refers to the
delivery of water to users or to specific
points in the irrigation system in the correct
amounts and at the correct times. Correct
amounts and times are best judged by how
close deliveries are to operating plans and
operating goals. In the Tambraparani
Irrigation System, as in most South Asian
irrigation systems, equity of delivery is one
of the goals of management; thus correct
deliveries are those that deliver the same
amount of water to each hectare throughout
the system. Efficiency of delivery is another
goal: only the necessary water should be
delivered so that the excess can be used for
other purposes.
Evaluating water delivery performance.
To investigate performance in the
Tambraparani Irrigation System, we ar-
ranged for the collection of detailed data on
water deliveries to the 11 channels from 1
April 1994 through 31 March 1995 (Krish-
nan Associates 1995). Using this data, water
distribution particulars for the year 1994–95
were calculated (table 5).
Water availability. The availability of
water was higher than normal in 1994–95.
The 11 channels received 1,621 million cubic
meters at the channel heads—51 percent
above the long-term average discharge vol-
ume of 1,074 million cubic meters. The
maximum cultivated area reported was
40,710 hectares (sum of bananas, pishanam
season rice, and pulses, which are not irri-
Consequences of the Deficiencies in the Tambraparani Rules
TABLE 5.
Main system water distribution performance of the Tambraparani Irrigation System, 1994–95.
Design Maximum Days of Irrigation Water Effici-
Rainfall discharge deliverya flowb water req. releasec encyd
Anicut Channel (mm) (l/s/ha) (%) (mm) (mm) (%)
Kodaimelalagian South Kodaimelalagian 847 3.11 70 78 1,590 5,807 27
North Kodaimelalagian 847 2.67 53 86 1,590 3,724 43
Nadhiyunni Nadhiyunni 847 2.30 61 66 1,590 3,754 42
Kannadian Kannadian 1,014 2.67 60 87 1,590 3,895 41
Ariyanayakipuram Kodagan 1,014 4.48 82 84 1,630 9,797 17
Palavoor Palayam 756 4.73 54 82 1,630 6,875 24
Suthamalli Tirunelveli 756 2.30 47 84 1,630 2,870 57
Marudur Marudur Melakkal 499 2.74 48 74 1,953 3,980 49
Marudur Keelakkal 499 2.72 67 75 1,953 5,569 35
Srivaikundam South Main 499 7.60 16 70 1,953 3,650 54
North Main 499 5.90 23 86 1,953 4,261 46
Average 734 53 79 1,733 4,926 39e
aMaximum discharge during the season divided by design discharge.
bNo. of days water was released into the channel divided by total no. of days in the season.
cVolume of water released into the channel divided by channel command area.
dIrrigation water requirement divided by water release.
eArithmetic average of the channel efficiencies.26
gated)—17 percent greater than the regis-
tered command of 34,934 hectares (table 4).
Deliveries to the channels. When there
is sufficient water, as there was in 1994–95,
the water distribution rules call for continu-
ous delivery to the channels. However, none
of the channels were operated continuously
throughout any season. Days operated var-
ied between 66 and 86 percent of the sea-
sons. The reasons for not operating the
channels continuously appear to be closure
of channels to save water and protect the
channels during periods of heavy rainfall;
occasional rotational operation in some
channels, such as the South Main and North
Main channels; and inability to control dis-
charges from the reservoirs.
The design discharges of the 11 chan-
nels range from 2.3 to 7.6 l/s/ha (20 to 75
mm/day). The South Main and North Main
channels, being the tail-end channels, were
designed as flood carriers, therefore they
were designed to carry high flows. Some
channels, such as the Kodagan and Palayam
channels, receive large amounts of drainage,
so their designed capacities were fairly high
(4.5 to 4.7 l/s/ha). All other channels were
designed for a flow of 2.3 to 3.1 l/s/ha.
During 1994–95, the maximum deliver-
ies to all 11 channels were less than the de-
sign discharges—maximum deliveries
ranged from 16 to 82 percent of the design
discharges. A comparison of design dis-
charge against deliveries indicates that there
is no correlation between the two. As ex-
pected, the last two channels in the system
(South Main and North Main channels) re-
ceived very low percentages of their design
discharges because they were designed to
carry floods. However, it is not clear why,
for example, Kodagan Channel received 82
percent of its design discharge.
Efficiency of delivery. The target annual
delivery to the channel heads is 2,340 milli-
meters.
5 In 1994–95, the water supplied at
the channel heads varied from 2,870 to 9,797
millimeters, or an excess of 23 to 219 per-
cent. Annual crop water requirements for
rice vary from 1,590 millimeters in the head
reach to 1,953 millimeters in the tail reach.
The water supplied was much greater than
the requirements (fig. 3); efficiency of sup-
ply varied between 57 percent and 17 per-
cent. One reason for the variations in effi-
ciency is that maintenance has been ne-
glected, and many channels are dilapidated
and infested with weeds. Repair and good
maintenance would improve channel con-
veyance efficiencies considerably. The
Tirunelveli Channel had the highest effi-
ciency, apparently due to recent channel
improvement works under the National
Water Management Project.
Also, drainage flows are ignored when
planning operations; flows at some anicuts
are higher than planned because of drain-
age into the river. Channels taking water di-
verted at these anicuts have low efficiency
figures. For example, because of a large
amount of drainage into the river, the
Kodagan Channel showed only a 17 percent
efficiency.
Most important, the daily demand for
each channel is set by its laskars without
regard for demands from other channels. To
serve their farmers, laskars may demand as
much water as they can get. The PWD offi-
cials have no way to verify the accuracy of
the demands, so they try to satisfy them in-
sofar as possible.
The average efficiency of supply for all
channels was 39 percent. The long-term av-
erage flow supplied at the channel heads is
1,074 million cubic meters, or an annual
supply of 3,072 millimeters for the regis-
tered command. The average annual crop
water requirement for rice is only 1,733 mil-
limeters. Consequently, if the channels were
operated at about 57 percent efficiency, it
would be possible to irrigate the entire reg-
5This is a target figure
used by the PWD engi-
neers; it is equivalent to
two seasons at the stan-
dard figure of 6 acres
per million cubic feet
used for allocation of
water for the kar and
advance kar seasons.27
istered command with an intensity of 200
percent in a normal year. At the 1994–95
average efficiency of 39 percent, this is not
possible, to say nothing of irrigating addi-
tional areas.
Main system water delivery perfor-
mance. This analysis of main system water
delivery performance in 1994–95 brings out
the following:
• Deliveries to the channels were far
short of the goal of continuous supply,
including full supply when required,
indicated in the operating rules.
• There were large inequities in water
distribution to the different channels.
• Water delivery efficiency was rather
low.
The 1994–95 hydrologic year had sig-
nificantly more water than the average year.
Therefore, we cannot infer that the ineffi-
ciencies and inequities found in 1994–95 are
repeated every year. However, table 3
shows that at least some of the problems
also occurred in 1992 and 1993.
Water distribution rules compared with
water delivery performance. The poor deliv-
ery performance on the main system in
Tambraparani in 1994–95 can be directly
linked to deficiencies and subversion of the
water distribution rules. The main system
management water distribution rules call
for determining daily demand for each
channel, consolidating that demand, and
trying to satisfy it. This system cannot lead
to equity and efficiency in water delivery
because:
• TNEB limits the flows in the river to
1,400 cusecs (39.6 m
3/s) under the rules,
which prevents PWD officials from sat-
isfying high levels of demand.
• Demand is defined by the laskars
whose primary loyalty is to the farmers
they serve. A laskar has no motivation
to help make water deliveries in the
whole system equitable and efficient;
his primary concern is to get enough
water to satisfy the farmers on his
channel.
• Farmers in different parts of the system
have little reason to cooperate among
themselves or with the PWD officials,
other than their own laskars, because
they have no means to influence deci-
sions about water deliveries in other
parts of the system.
• The great influence that farmers, par-
ticularly tail farmers, exert over alloca-
tions, keeps allocations from being as
closely related to water availability as
they should be. When water availability
is low, manipulations of allocations and
deliveries by farmers and laskars can
stress portions of the system.
The poor water delivery performance
observed in 1994–95 is in large part a prod-
uct of the deficiencies in the water distribu-
tion rules. This suggests that, even in a year
FIGURE 3.
Water deliveries to the channels, 1994–95.
(Dark shading shows channel requirement.)28
with lower water availability, water delivery
performance in the Tambraparani Irrigation
System is likely to be poor.
In Tambraparani, there are opportuni-
ties to improve water delivery performance
through better management. However, to
do so would require modifying the alloca-
tion rules so that farmers have no need to
pressure system managers for special re-
leases or to take water from channels in an
unplanned way, modifying the rules that al-
low the TNEB to prevent the PWD officials
from releasing water from the reservoirs as
needed, and modifying the main system
management rules that allow the laskars to
unilaterally define demands at the channel
heads. In addition, better information on
rainfall and reuse would allow modification
of deliveries to the channels to make use of
these sources of water. Also, better channel
maintenance would increase the efficiency
of delivery on the channels.
Because our data does not let us ana-
lyze water deliveries on the channels, we
make no comments here about changes to
the scheduling rules for the channels.
Transaction costs and the
institutional environment of
irrigation management
The deficiencies of the Tambraparani water
distribution rules increase irrigation costs in
several ways.
Increases in transaction costs. Subver-
sion and evasion of the water distribution
rules in Tambraparani raise the transaction
costs of irrigation service for farmers. Cur-
rently, state irrigation charges are incorpo-
rated into land taxes.
Besides the state irrigation charges,
Tambraparani farmers also bear the ex-
pense:
• of giving payments and gifts to laskars
to reward them and to ensure their co-
operation.
• of pressuring officials, through WUAs,
to authorize irrigation allocations or
special issues for their areas. This en-
tails the cost of maintaining the WUA
as well as giving gifts to the officials
and covering the costs of meeting with
the officials, etc.
• of carrying out demonstrations and dis-
ruptive tactics, requiring organizational
effort and time and carrying the risk of
punishment by the police.
• of, in extreme cases, taking their water
problems to court through WUAs. This
includes the time, effort, and other costs
of creating and maintaining WUAs for
this purpose, as well as the court costs.
Weakening government institutions.
Evasion and subversion of the water
distribution rules lessen the effectiveness of
the PWD and weaken other government
agencies connected with irrigation. The
PWD officials are placed in the difficult
position of either trying to follow the
distribution rules or serving the farmers by
subverting the rules; they cannot do both
effectively. If they follow the rules, they face
conflicts, insubordination, subversion, and
other problems. If they serve the farmers
against the rules, they can no longer justify
their actions to critics, making it difficult to
enforce discipline within the organization.
Farmers and officials are aware that actual
water distribution is far from what it is sup-
posed to be. Yet, to keep their jobs, PWD offi-
cials, district collectors, and other government
officials try to appear to operate according to
the rules. This results in incorrect reports on
cultivated areas and other faulty data. This
also means that the officials cannot operate in
the most effective ways, resulting in a loss of
respect for the government officials.29
Weakening of government authority
adds to the transaction costs of irrigation. If
government agencies are ineffectual, farm-
ers are forced to rely upon themselves to
protect their resources and rights from dep-
redations by others. A major reason for the
large number of WUAs in the Tambraparani
Irrigation System is that WUAs are the farm-
ers’ means of protecting their rights. Al-
though many WUAs in Tambraparani had
their origins in tank management organiza-
tions, the number of WUAs has risen
greatly since the 1960s (Pundarikanthan et
al. 1992) because of the increasing numbers
of conflicts over water.
Loss to the government. Farmers are
obviously willing to pay the higher
transaction costs forced by the mismatch of
rules and goals. As Repetto (1986) points
out, these payments are a form of economic
rent that is now being captured by officials.
This observation suggests that, by changing
the rules and by establishing a new system
for levying irrigation fees, the state could
collect these extra resources. The state is
losing an opportunity to help its finances.
Losses to the Manimuthar farmers. An-
other consequence of the deficiencies in the
distribution rules is that water that the state
intended for the farmers under the Mani-
muthar High Level Canal is being diverted
to farmers in the Tambraparani Irrigation
System. We have no data to show the conse-
quences of this diversion. Presumably, crop
production is lower within the Manimuthar
command than it would be if water allo-
cated to it by the rules were delivered.
Changing the water distribution
rules
Improving the situation in Tambraparani.
The deficiencies in the rules have led to
poor water distribution performance and
have aggravated conflicts among farmers.
Evasion and subversion of the rules are
widespread.
Enforcing the rules, however, is not the
way to improve the situation. Doing so
probably would lower the value of crop
production and probably is not possible,
given the collusion of government officials
in the subversion of the rules. The key to
improving the situation lies in changing the
rules, within the bounds of technical possibili-
ties, to remove the inconsistencies and to make
the rules define patterns of delivery that bet-
ter match the goals of all the users.
Improvements are quite feasible. The
total crop water requirement for bananas,
over the full year, is 1,600 millimeters,
whereas the total crop water requirement
for two rice crops in the tail reaches is 1,953
millimeters. That is, bananas require less
water than two rice crops. Thus, changing
the rules to sanction delivery of water for
bananas need not result in losses to rice
farmers, although it might shift areas irri-
gated during drier parts of the year from
one part of the scheme to another
(Pundarikanthan et al. 1992). Further, recog-
nizing and abetting the spread of banana
cultivation in Tambraparani would make
the irrigation demand more even over the
year and would make irrigation require-
ments more compatible with power genera-
tion requirements.
Why have the rules remained un-
changed? Virtually everyone involved in
managing the Tambraparani Irrigation
System recognizes the need for change.
Interviewed PWD officials say that system
operations could be adapted to irrigate
bananas, thus solving one major problem.
Farmers too would like the rules changed.
But officials and farmers do not change the
operating rules for several reasons.
First, farmers cannot initiate the change
process; only the district collector or the30
PWD executive engineer can initiate a
change in the rules. Proposed changes have
to be taken to higher levels in the PWD and
other state agencies for approval. Changes
to “rules of regulation” require state cabinet
approval.
Second, appealing to the district collec-
tor is a standard means for the general
population to initiate government action.
However, for the Tambraparani Irrigation
System, neither of the two district collectors
will initiate changes without the consent of
the other. Persuading a district collector to
change the rules was much simpler in the
1960s when advance kar season was autho-
rized, because only one collector had to be
convinced.
Third, there is no constituency for
change among the officials of the PWD.
Some PWD officials gain from the present
situation (cf. Ramamurthy 1989; Repetto
1986). Other PWD officials feel no pressure
to improve system performance.
Finally, officials are slow to initiate
changes because farmers differ on the de-
sired changes. The court cases mentioned
earlier show that farmers are not in full
agreement over how the rules should be
changed.
These factors make the change process
long and difficult.
Proposed changes and the need for con-
sultation with farmers. In 1991, the PWD
commissioned the Indian Institute of Tech-
nology, Madras, to do a study of the
Tambraparani Irrigation System. One objec-
tive was to recommend revised rules of
regulation for the system to incorporate the
Servalar Reservoir. Based on simulation
studies, the institute’s reports recommend
changes in Tambraparani water distribution
rules, including the recognition of addi-
tional cropping systems (Raman, Elango,
and Mohan 1993). Their recommendations
are now under consideration by the PWD.
At present, water distribution rules for
irrigation in Tamil Nadu are set and re-
viewed by the state agencies; consultation
with the users is not required and is some-
times foregone. In Tambraparani, failure to
carry out sufficient consultation has led to
the deficiencies in the rules. In contrast,
rules for water distribution for industrial
and municipal uses are set by discussions
and negotiation between the state and the
interested parties. This process has had
good results. This contrast clearly suggests a
need to consult farmers on the rules for ir-
rigation. It also suggests that farmers and
other users should have the power to ini-
tiate review of the water distribution rules.
Technical studies, such as the ones by the
Indian Institute of Technology, are needed
to check the technical feasibility of proposed
changes or to form the basis for change pro-
posals, but they are not substitutes for di-
rect consultation with the users.
A key reason for consultations with
farmers is to get the farmers to understand
and accept limitations imposed by water
availability and technical problems. That is,
farmers must realistically adapt their desires
to the limitations of the situation. It has
been shown elsewhere that once farmers
understand the limitations of the system
and of their own power, they are also will-
ing to modify their expectations from the
system (Brewer, Sakthivadivel, and Soma-
ratne 1993).
Consultation on changes to the water
distribution rules should include representa-
tives of all interested persons. In the case of
Tambraparani, this would mean that the
farmers under the Manimuthar Reservoir
command should be included in the consul-
tations.
Tradeoffs in changing the water distri-
bution rules. There are tradeoffs to be con-
sidered when considering changes to the
Tambraparani water distribution rules. Be-31
cause in present market conditions bananas
are much more profitable for farmers than
rice, changing the rules to serve banana cul-
tivation will benefit farmers. The only
tradeoff would occur if tail farmers’ cultiva-
tion of bananas deprives head and middle
areas of water for other crops. This problem
can be prevented by careful rule formula-
tion. It may be impossible to prevent when,
as at present, water is allocated through
subversion of the rules.
On the other hand, changing operating
rules for the Papanasam and Servalar reser-
voirs to allow larger releases for irrigation
may affect the TNEB’s ability to provide
electricity at times of low inflow to the res-
ervoirs. There may be a need to weigh the
value of the power against the value of the
crops. Similarly, improving the Manimuthar
Reservoir operating rules may require bal-
ancing the crop production and implicit
rights to water of the farmers in the
Manimuthar command against the crops
and rights of farmers in the Tambraparani
command.
The Lessons of Tambraparani
This study of the Tambraparani Irrigation
System suggests several lessons. First, if the
- rules to make an irrigation system serve
their desires. Evasion and subversion of the
water distribution rules have adverse conse-
quences, including poor water distribution
performance and higher costs for irrigators.
Second, inconsistent sets of water distribu-
tion rules cause operational problems that
are likely to lead to failure to obey the rules
and to poor water distribution performance.
A corollary to these findings is that ap-
propriate provisions should be made for
modifying water distribution rules as prob-
lems are discovered or demands change.
These provisions should include means that
give the users direct input into the redesign
of these rules.
Need for change
Changes in demands on irrigation systems
are accelerating with population growth
and development. Population growth is a
major source of change and generally leads
to demands for more irrigated farmland, for
more water for municipal and domestic
needs, and for water for industrial develop-
ment. Increasing crop diversification also
places additional demands on irrigation sys-
tem management. Such changes are com-
mon in all developing countries.
Responding effectively to these changes
requires altering the institutional resources
used for managing irrigation systems, in-
cluding the formal water distribution rules.
As pointed out by Templer (1984, 43):
Natural resource managers and planners
sometimes overlook the significance of this
invisible institutional framework, despite the fact
that it can serve as an absolute constraint on the
way in which water and related land are used.
Once established in the law by court decision,
statute, or customary practice, water law
systems resist change and are often difficult to
replace or modernize to keep pace with
changing water demands or social concerns. As
competition for limited water supplies increases,
these slowly evolving institutions can have a
significant impact on opportunities for efficient
water use and management . . . .32
Adapting water distribution rules
to changing demands
How can the responsible persons and agen-
cies ensure that water distribution rules are
consistent and adapted to the technically
feasible goals of the users? One part of the
answer lies in developing a concern for the
consequences of the present rules and man-
agement practices. System managers should
not only be concerned with ensuring that
the rules are being followed, they should
also be concerned with whether they are
achieving the expected overall ends
(Murray-Rust and Snellen 1993; Bos et al.
1994). If system managers periodically ex-
amine the latter aspect, they will be forced
to face the changing demands of the users.
We recommend that system managers, to-
gether with user representatives, formally
review system performance annually (cf.
Frederiksen 1992).
The second part of the answer lies in
providing effective “voice” to farmers and
other users. It is in the interest of users to
remove inconsistencies and to adapt the dis-
tribution rules to their goals. If farmers and
other users have direct influence over sys-
tem management, they are likely to force
needed changes. When demands for water
increase to the point that not all persons
desiring water can be served, then the hard
decisions about who is to get water must be
made by the political authorities. Making
the users part of the process will make these
hard decisions more politically acceptable.
Of course, water distribution rules must be
adapted to technical realities, as well as to
the goals of the users.
The change process must not be so
quick and easy that water distribution rules
are changed often or without good reason.
Rapid changes negate the main advantages
of water distribution rules—predictability
and ease of decision making. Balance is
required between providing ways to change
the rules and making changes sufficiently
difficult so that only necessary changes are
made. Requiring effective consultation with
the users will help provide this balance.
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